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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Joan Kennedy Taylor*
Recent sexual harassment cases wending their
way through the judicial system raise and highlight
potential conflicts between the current judicial as-
sumptions about what constitutes "hostile environ-
ment" harassment and the current judicial assump-
tions about the constitutional protection of speech.'
As Kingsley R. Browne puts it, "[i]n contrast with
the immediate rejection of regulation of campus
speech and pornography that was deemed to convey
a 'wrongheaded' view about women, regulation of
offensive speech in the workplace has been proceed-
ing apace virtually without comment for well over a
decade." 2 However, several recent cases are forcing
judges and juries to grapple with the potential con-
flict between Title VII and the First Amendment.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,4 is one
such case. While authorities agree it represents a
first for Title VII decisions, there is disagreement re-
garding Robinson's importance to the Title VII and
* Ms. Taylor is the author of Reclaiming the Mainstream:
Individualist Feminism Rediscovered and the vice president and
co-chair of the legal committee of Feminists for Free Expression,
a national nonprofit anticensorship organization.
1 Protected speech is now widely defined to include expres-
sive actions. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(holding that a regula-
tion prohibiting school children from wearing armbands to
exhibit their disapproval of Vietnam hostilities was an unconsti-
tutional denial of students' rights of expression of opinion);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U:S. 397 (1989)(holding that the act of
burning the American flag during a protest rally was expressive
conduct within the protection of the First Amendment).
' Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-En-
vironment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 481, 482 (1991).
o Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
' 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
* The Robinson case is
apparently the first reported decision to impose liability
for sexual harassment based entirely on the pervasive
presence of sexually oriented magazines, pin-up pic-
tures-such as Playboy foldouts and tool-company calen-
dars-and "sexually demeaning remarks and jokes" by
male coworkers; the plaintiff complained of neither physi-
cal assaults nor sexual propositions.
Browne, supra note 2, at 495. "The court also examined, albeit
superficially, the argument that the First Amendment imposes
First Amendment issues." This Article discusses that
conflict. Part I details the decisions in the two sexual
harassment cases, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson'
and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' that have been
decided by the Supreme Court. Part II describes four
recent sexual harassment cases. The cases this article
addresses in addition to the Robinsona case are
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Depart-
ment,9 Bowman v. Heller,"° and Cohen v. San Ber-
nardino Valley College." Part III focuses on the
First Amendment implications of these cases. Part
IV traces the failings in current sexual harassment
law to the courts' reliance on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines"2
and their derivatives,"3 and examines a new standard
advocated by Feminists for Free Expression
("FFE")." This Article endorses the development of
a new definition of sexual harassment that critically
examines the EEOC Guidelines in the light of First
limits on the kind of activity that can be the subject of sexual
harassment claims." Id. at 495 n.91. But see Amy Horton, Com-
ment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Har-
assment, the First Amendment, and ih Contours of Title VII,
46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 403, 418 n.38 (191y ("For perhaps the
first time in a sexual harassment case, a court addresses First
Amendment issues at length.")
o 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
7 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
8 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1486.
9 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
10 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995).
"1 883 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995).
' See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11I (West
1995); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1510 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aft'd, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1539
(M.D. Fla. 1991)(stating the sexual harassment policies of Jack-
sonville Shipyards Incorporated ("JSI")).
14 FFE is an organization started in 1992 by diverse femi-
nist women who share a commitment both to gender equality
and to preserving the individual's right and responsibility to
read, view, and produce expressive materials of her or his own
choice, free from government interference "for our own good." It
is active in a variety of litigation, lobbying, and educational ef-
forts to forestall censorship, predominantly including those issues
which arise from antidiscrimination-law inspired workspeech
regulations.
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Amendment considerations, using the FFE standard
as a starting point for discussion.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT STANDARD
A number of cases of sexual harassment are mov-
ing through the system. In some of them, sexual ex-
pression seems to be defined as being per se
harassing.
What can we expect the 'Supreme Court to decide
if any of these cases reach that august body? Despite
the large number of lower court decisions, so far, the
Court has only heard two cases dealing with sexual
harassment, the aforementioned Meritor and Harris
decisions.
A. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
Mechelle Vinson was hired by Sidney Taylor, vice
president of a bank and manager of one of its branch
offices. 15 She worked at that branch for four years,
moving from teller-trainee to assistant branch man-
ager before she was fired on November 1, 1978, for
excessive use of sick leave.16 She then brought suit
for sexual harassment against both Taylor and the
bank, claiming that, as soon as her probationary pe-
riod as a trainee was over, Taylor successfully made
demands for sexual favors, to which she acquiesced
in fear of losing her job."7 She also claimed that he
fondled her in public, exposed himself to her, and
forcibly raped her."6 Taylor denied all charges, and
the District Court for the Middle District of Ten-
nessee found that if Vinson and Taylor had a sexual
relationship, it was entered into voluntarily and Vin-
son was, therefore, not a victim of harassment."
Further, the court held that, since the bank had a
policy against sexual harassment and there were no
prior complaints lodged against Taylor, "the bank
was without notice and cannot be held liable for the
alleged actions of Taylor. ' '20
The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, sup-
porting its action with reference to the EEOC
Guidelines on sexual harassment as a violation of
16 Meritor, 477.U.S. at 59.
10 Id. at 60.
17 Id.
is Id.
19 Id. at 61.
20 Id.at 62 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair. Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980)).
2 Id.
22 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 The.
Guidelines prohibit "[h]arassment on the basis of
sex" and state that "[ulnwelcome sexual:. advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature" constitute sexual.
harassment. under any. one of three conditions: when
"submission. to such conduct is made either explicitly.
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment," when employment decisions are made
on the basis of "submission to or rejection of such
conduct," or when "such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.. '22 The
first two conditions are generally referred to as "quid
pro quo" sexual harassment. It is the third condi-
tion, the "hostile working environment," that has
been increasingly hard for the courts to define. De-
spite Vinson's allegations, Meritor was considered to
be a hostile environment case.2"
The Court of Appeals also held "that an employer
is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced
by supervisory personnel, whether or not the em-
ployer knew or should have known about the mis-
conduct." '24 In a unanimous opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals decision.2 5 However, there was
disagreement over the issue of employer' liability.
The Court of Appeals held that the employer was
always liable,26 while the Supreme Court held that
liability should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 7
A concurring opinion by Justice Marshall, signed by
three other justices, urged some limitation on em-
ployer liability, but also argued for the "same rules
we apply in all other Title VII cases.., sexual har-
assment by a supervisor of an employee under his
supervision, leading to a discriminatory work envi-
ronment, should be imputed to the employer for Ti-
tle VII purposes regardless of whether the employee
gave 'notice' of the offense."' 26 Although this was de-
cided as a "hostile environment" case, no speech is-
sues surfaced in the discussion of the facts. This was
not so in the next sexual harassment case to be heard
by the Court.
*s The Court decided that the sexual favors Taylor insisted
on were not part of any overt quid pro quo agreement and it
was agreed that Vinson's promotions were earned by merit.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
, Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
18 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
:6 Id.
27 Id.
2S Id. at 64.
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B. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
Teresa Harris worked as the rental manager at an
equipment rental company, Forklift Systems, Inc.,
from April 1985 to October 1987.1" Harris accused
Forklift's president, Charles Hardy, of sexual har-
assment.8 0 According to Harris, Hardy publicly
made her the target of sexual innuendos, insulted her
because of her gender, and asked her to perform hu-
miliating tasks, such as picking up objects he threw
down in front of her and getting coins out of his
front pants pocket.8" Harris confronted Hardy in
August 1987.3' Hardy claimed to be joking and
apologized to keep her on the job." Some time later,
Hardy asked Harris, in the presence of others, if she
had made a particular deal with a customer by
promising him sex." At that point, Harris quit her
job.3 5
Harris sued for sexual harassment, and the
United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee found it to be a "close case,"3 6 but fol-
lowed Sixth Circuit precedent in finding that only
abuse strong enough to cause psychological damage
could be said to create an "abusive environment."3 7
Since Harris had not suffered "severe psychological
injury," she could not prevail even though Hardy's
comments "would offend the reasonable woman."3 8
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a
short, unpublished decision." The case was argued
before the Supreme Court on October 13, 1993, and
decided less than a month later, on November 9,
1993. The Court's quick decision in Harris caused
court watchers to speculate that the Court was send-
ing the message that harassment is a serious issue. 0
The opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, was
again unanimous, with concurring opinions by Jus-
11 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
0 Id.
91 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
" Id.
*8 Id.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 240 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
'4 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481. U.S. 1041 (1987); accord, Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir.
1989); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
" Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 245 (M.D. Tenn.
1991)).
39 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1992).
40 See, e.g., Barbara Presley Noble, Little Discord on Har-
tices Scalia and Ginsberg."1
The Court reaffirmed the standard of Meritor that
Title VII is violated by discriminatory behavior that
creates a "hostile or abusive" environment." The
"reasonable woman" standard that surfaced in sev-
eral cases, including Robinson43 was discarded for a
"reasonable person" standard."' One of the issues
raised in Meritor was whether Congress intended an
economic harm be present in order to sustain a
charge of sexual discrimination, and, therefore, of
sexual harassment.' 5 The Meritor court decided oth-
erwise.' Harris now has made it clear that severe
psychological harm also need not be present, by say-
ing that although "Title VII bars conduct that
would seriously affect a reasonable person's psycho-
logical well-being . . . the statute is not limited to
such conduct.'4 O'Connor's opinion explicitly stated
that the relevant standard "takes a middle path be-
tween making actionable any conduct that is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangi-
ble psychological injury . . . Title VII comes into
play before the, harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown."'"
The Court also took a step toward a more exact
definition of sexual harassment by listing circum-
stances that must be examined in order to find that a
work environment is hostile or abusive. The decision
says:
whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances.
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
assment Ruling, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at 25.
4' Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
42 Id.
"' Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
"I Id.; see also Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The argument
against the "reasonable woman" standard was well-put by an
amicus brief in Bowman. That brief argued that "[t]he reach for
a gender-specific standard reflects a residue of the 'double stan-
dard' that is traditionally applied to sexuality: the notion that a
'reasonable man' would not be offended by a picture of a naked
person in a sexually suggestive pose, but a 'reasonable woman'
would." Brief of Amicus Curiae, Women's Bar Association of
Massachusetts at 18, Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass.
1995).
4 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
46 Id.
47 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
41 Id. at 370.
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performance.4 '
Helpful as this step is, it leaves the standard by
which to differentiate protected speech from discrim-
inatory harassment unexplained. Does an "offensive
utterance" amount to discrimination, or is it to be
distinguished from "physically threatening or humil-
iating" behavior because, unlike them, it is protected
by the First Amendment?
One such standard was suggested in an amicus
brief submitted in Harris by FFE.' ° The FFE ar-
gues, in its brief, that both the "psychological harm"
test of the lower court in Harris and the "offensive-
ness" test adopted by other courts51 were unduly
subjective, as well as overbroad and vague. FFE pro-
posed the following: "Title VII liability should be
imposed only for a pattern or practice of speech or
conduct targeting a specific employee or employees,
which a reasonable person would experience as har-
assment, and which has demonstrably hindered the
employee in his or her job performance.""
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion- expresses con-
cern about the lack of clarity both in the statute and
in the idea of an "abusive" or "hostile" work envi-
ronment." He applauds the listing of factors that
"contribute to abusiveness," and particularly calls at-
tention to "whether the conduct unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee's work performance," which
Justice Scalia argues "would, if it were made an ab-
solute test, provide greater guidance to juries and
employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation in
the language of the statute . . . the test is not
whether work has been impaired, but whether work-
ing conditions have been discriminatorily altered.""14
Justice Ginsberg's opinion makes a related point
that "the adjudicator's inquiry should center, domi-
nantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work
performance." 55
40 Id. at 371.
50 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Feminists for Free Expression in
Support of Petitioner at 31 n.5, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114
S. Ct. 367 (1993)(No. 92-1168)[hereinafter FFE Harris Brief],
6' See generally Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469
(3rd Cir. 1990); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d
559 (8th Cir. 1992); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991)).
" FFE Harris Brief, supra note 50, at 31.
" Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring).
' Id.
I5 d. at 372 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
56 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1493 (M.D. Fla. 1991). In 1986, the Shipyard employed
546 men in that category, but only six women. Id.
57 Id. at 1494.
Neither of these decisions gives guidance as to how
the Court will address the First Amendment conflicts
surfacing in the cases under consideration in this
article.
II. RECENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CASES
A. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
Lois Robinson was a welder employed at the
Jacksonville Shipyards from 1977 to 1988, one of a
small number of females working there as skilled
craftworkers." Robinson brought suit for sexual
harassment after years of battling to get explicitly
sexual pictures of women taken down from the walls
of offices and common areas, and to have workers
reprimanded for lewd or "demeaning" remarks."
Most of the evidence considered by the court was of
a general atmosphere of raunchy pictures and re-
marks rather than of an intention to target Robinson
specifically, although there was other evidence of in-
cidents directed at her.5 Refusing to adopt the view-
point of a previous case arising from Florida,
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.," the Florida Dis-
trict Court in Robinson stated, "[tjo the extent that
Rabidue holds that some forms of abusive, anti-fe-
male behavior must be tolerated in the work envi-
ronment because that behavior is prominent in soci-
ety at large, the case conflicts with the established
law in this Circuit." 60 Instead, the court adopted a
"reasonable woman" standard,"' holding that speech
is unlawful if "a reasonable woman . . . would per-
ceive that an abusive working environment has been
created."6 Further, the court adopted a "totality of
the circumstances"68 analysis of a hostile environ-
ment, finding that the impact of multiple incidents
may accumulate in such a way that "the environ-
" Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harass-
ment and Upholding the First Amendment - Avoiding a Colli-
sion, 37 VILL. L. REv. 757, 769 (1992).
59 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1041
(1987) (holding that the offensive conduct must occur with some
frequency in order to be actionable).
'0 Browne, supra note 2, at 494 n.82. "The court rejected
the suggestion of Rabidue that sexually oriented pictures and
comments standing alone cannot form the basis for Title VII lia-
bility, stating that 'excluding some forms of offensive conduct as
a matter of law is not consistent with the factually oriented ap-
proach' required by Title VII." Id. at 495.
* See supra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text.
" Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
63 Id. at 1523.
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ment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal defini-
tion of an abusive working environment although no
single episode crosses the Title VII threshold."'6 4
Because of this analysis, the court decided that,
despite First Amendment arguments to the contrary,
the employer was liable for sexual harassment by re-
peatedly refusing to take down sexually explicit pic-
tures posted in common work areas. 5 The court also
went so far as to find that, since the speech at issue
was "discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile
work environment,"6 it constituted "[plotentially ex-
pressive activities that produce special harms distinct
from their communicative impact," and, therefore,
"the speech at issue is indistinguishable from the
speech that comprises a crime such as threats of vio-
lence or blackmail .. . .
Finally, the Robinson court required that not only
must sexual pictures be banned henceforth from
Jacksonville Shipyards, but employees must not be
in possession of "sexually suggestive" reading mate-
rial at work.6" Additionally, the court defined the
"sexual pictures" broadly, as depicting a person
(male or female) "who is not fully clothed or in
clothes that are not suited to or ordinarily accepted
for the accomplishment of routine work in and
around the shipyard and who is posed for the obvi-
ous purpose of displaying or drawing attention to
private portions of his or her body."'"
B. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire
Department
In the Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire De-
partment case, veteran firefighter Captain Steven W.
Johnson challenged part of the new sexual harass-
" Id. at 1524.
05 Id. at 1531.
" Id. at 1535.
67 Id.
" Id. at 1542. Usually, "at work" means the period of time
when employees are being paid to perform productive tasks, not
including lunch breaks. In re Peyton Packing Company, Inc.
and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N.A.,
A.F. of L., Local #606, Case No. C-2466 - Decided May 18,
1943, Decision and Order, 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)
*9 Id.
70 The specific provisions were as follows:
The following types of sexual material are prohibited in
all work locations, including dormitories, rest rooms and
lockers ... sexually-oriented magazines, particularly those
containing nude pictures, such as Playboy, Penthouse and
Playgirl ....
Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. at 1433; see
also Charles Levendosky, Firefighter Wins Right to Read Play-
boy, CASPAR STAR TRIB., June 12, 1994, at A10.
ment policy of the Los Angeles County Fire
Department. 0
The shifts that firefighters work often require
them to spend several days and nights in the fire
house, living in dormitories and being on call
twenty-four hours a day.7' Captain Johnson had
been a firefighter for twenty-seven years, and some-
times worked as many as three twenty-four hour
shifts in succession.72 Because it was his habit to
read Playboy magazine while on call, Captain John-
son sued the Los Angeles County Fire Department
for violating his First Amendment rights when the
new sexual harassment policy went into effect.7"
In a narrow decision, Federal District Court
Judge Stephen Wilson defended Johnson's right to
"quiet possession, reading and sharing of Playboy
magazine. ' 7 Judge Wilson added that "[t]he policy
poses a particularly severe restriction on plaintiff's
First Amendment rights."
'7 5
This decision caused public friction in the ranks of
the National Organization for Women ("NOW").
The president of the Los Angeles chapter of NOW
immediately criticized the decision by saying, "'[t]his
judge has ruled that men have more rights in the
workplace than women .. .This is astounding and
shocking.'7 1 In contrast, a spokeswoman for the San
Fernando Valley-Northeast Los Angeles chapter
called it " 'absolutely consistent' with the state NOW
policy," and was backed by NOW's California state
coordinator.7
C. Bowman v. Heller
The Bowman v. HellerF6 case represents one of
the more controversial sexual harassment decisions.
7' Levendosky, supra note 70.
7" Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1434; see also Levendosky,
supra note 70.
78 Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1434.
7' Id. The court also took into account testimony about Play-
boy's content. Levendosky, supra note 70.
75 Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438; see also Federal Judge
Overturns Playboy Ban at Firehouses, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 10, 1994, at A8.
76 See, e.g., Michael Fleeman, Playboy Ruling Doesn't Faze
All NOW Leaders Judge Says Firefighter Can Read It, And
Some Feminists Say 'So What?', SACRAMENTO BEE, June 11,
1994, at B5; Playboy Ruling Spurs NOW Split, LAS VEGAS
REV., June 11, 1994, at 16A; Michael Fleeman, NOW Split on
Playboys in Fire Stations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 11, 1994.
17 Michael Fleeman, Playboy Ruling Doesn't Faze All
NOW Leaders Judge Says Firefighter Can Read it, and Some
Feminists Say 'So What?' SACRAMENTO BEE, June 11, 1994, at
B5.
78 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995).
1996]
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Bowman addresses a head-on collision between the
protection of political speech and a targeted sexual
affront in the workplace. Sylvia Smith Bowman, a
social work supervisor and union activist in the
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, was
running for president of Local 509 of the Service
Employees International Union in the fall of 1987.79
David Heller, twenty-six years younger than Bow-
man, was a regular staff member in the same office,
and was active in the same election campaign.1a Hel-
ler was a staunch supporter of Bowman's opponent,
incumbent union president Fred Trusten.'
Heller took Bowman's photograph and printed
name from her campaign literature and made com-
posites of these materials and two provocative pic-
tures of naked female bodies "which he had clipped
from a Penthouse or Hustler-style magazine." 2 He
then made "five or six" photocopies of the collages
and gave them to five of the workers in the office.' 8
Heller and a co-worker testified that Heller asked
the recipients not to distribute them or to show them
to Bowman, but one of the five gave copies to Bow-
man's campaign manager, who then told Bowman
about the photocopies. 8 '
Bowman delayed looking at the photocopies until
after the election was over. 6 Bowman then com-
plained to her supervisor and filed a complaint with
the Department of Public Welfare, which suspended
Heller for five days without pay for "sexually
harassing" Bowman.8s She also distributed flyers
about the incident at a NOW public event, and in
January 1988, consulted a therapist.87 In February
1988, a complaint was filed with the Union Trial
Board, which found that Heller had "committed
conduct unbecoming a union member," 88 and, as a
result, Heller issued a public, written apology to the
union and to Bowman in February 1989.89
Finally, on June 6, 1990, Bowman filed a lawsuit
against not only Heller but the Commissioner of the
Department of Public Welfare and some of its su-
79 Id. at 372.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Brief for the Appellant David Heller on Appeal from the
Suffolk County Superior Court, at 10, Bowman v. Heller, 651
N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995)[hereinafter Heller Appellant's Brief].
" Bowman, 651 N.E.2d at 372.
Heller Appellant's Brief, supra note 82, at 12.
88 Bowman lost the election. Id. at 13.
Id. at 2.
I d. at 13, 16, 17. Bowman had a pre-existing history of
alcoholism, hospitalization for depression, and sexual abuse by a
family member as a child. Id. at 17 n.16.
99 Id. at 2.
pervisory and management personnel.9 A settlement
agreement was reached with all the defendants ex-
cept Heller, and the cases against them were dis-
missed on December 18, 1991.1'
Bowman originally charged Heller with inten-
tional and reckless infliction of emotional distress as
well as defamation, for having violated the Massa-
chusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA") by depriving
her of her right "'to run for the presidency of her
union local.' "' In 1992, after consulting a new
therapist who diagnosed her as suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder,98 Bowman moved to
amend her original complaint, alleging that Heller
violated another provision of the MCRA by "depriv-
ing her of her right to be free from sexual harass-
ment. '' " The motion was granted on July 7, 1992,
and a year later, on July 9, 1993, Judge Flannery of
the Suffolk County Superior Court awarded her
damages, holding that Heller sexually harassed
Bowman, attempted to deprive her of her right to
run for office, and tortiously caused her emotional
distress.'
In order to show that a violation of the MCRA
has occurred, it is necessary to prove "threat, intimi-
dation, or coercion." 96 On June 13, 1995, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
"judgment based on the tort claim of intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress,"'" but va-
cated the judgment "to the extent that it is based on
any violation of the MCRA."' 8 The trial judge
"credited the defendant's claim that . . . 'it was not
his intent to sway votes or to induce people not to
vote for [the plaintiff].' "9' This enabled the judge to
find that Heller's intent was the infliction of emo-
tional distress, and so to rule for Bowman despite
finding that she was a limited-purpose public figure
because of her participation in the union election.' 00
Presumably, had the union election been part of the
issue, Bowman, as a public figure, would have lost
her case.
69 Id.
80 Id. at 3.
81 Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d 369, n.1 (Mass. 1995).
92 Heller Appellant's Brief, supra note 82, at 3 (quoting
Record Appendix).
93 Id. at 16.
94 Id. at 4.
9i Id. at 4-5.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H-11I (West 1995).
97 Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d. 369, 372 (Mass. 1995).
98 Id. at 372 n.4.
99 Id. at 372.
100 Id. at 373.
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The Supreme Judicial Court's .decision disagreed
with this part of the trial judge's ruling, and held
that she was neither a public figure nor a limited
public figure. 0 1 Judge Nolan, in his dissent, which
was joined by Judge Lynch, argued that "the plain-
tiff became a limited purpose public figure when she
voluntarily thrust herself '' into the election cam-
paign,"109 and that "the caricatures at issue ad-
dressed the plaintiff's campaign for .the. presidency,
despite their horrid content."103 Therefore, said. the
dissent, the actual malice. standard should apply,10'
and since Bowman hadn't shown that the caricatures
contained a false statement of fact, she. should not
prevail.1 5 The Supreme Judicial Court, which
transferred the case from the appellate court on its
own motion, did not perpetuate the "reasonable wo-
man" standard in its decision.
D. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College
In Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, the
issues are slightly different because this is a case that
deals with sexual harassment in an educational envi-
ronment rather than in the work place. Dean Cohen
is a tenured professor who has been teaching English
and Film Studies at San Bernardino Valley College
("SBVC") for twenty-seven years.' 0 He assigns and
discusses controversial subjects.10 In February of
1992, in a remedial English class, Cohen. began a
classroom discussion of pornography. He told his
students that he has written for the magazines Hus-
tler and Playboy, and he asked his students to write
essays that defined pornography. 08 One.of his stu-
dents, Anita Murillo, stopped attending the class af-
ter Cohen refused to give her an alternative assign-
ment to the paper on pornography, and failed the
course.1 0 9 She subsequently complained, of sexual
harassment to the head of the English Department,
101 Id. at 375.
101 Id. at 376 (Nolan J., dissenting).
103 Id.
104 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In
Falwell, the Court held that recovery for a public figure re-
quired showing that a publication contains a false statement of
fact which was made with "actual malice" - either knowing that
the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether
or not it was false, Id. "In other words, the Court required
public officials or public figures who claim intentional infliction
of emotional distress to satisfy the same heavy burden of proof it
imposes upon such individuals who bring defamation claims."
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Mod-
est Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 516-17 (1990).
10I Bowman, 651 N.E.2d at 380.
10 Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp.
and ultimately filed a formal grievance against Co-
hen in May of 1993.110
After a series of hearings within the college sys-
tem, rulings against Cohen, and appeals, the San
Bernardino Community College Board of Trustees
found that Cohen sexually harassed Murillo and is-
sued a four-part order requiring Cohen to 1) provide
students and the department chair with an advance
syllabus that dealt not only with -the .content of his
classes but with his teaching style, purpose, and
method; 2) attend a sexual harassment seminar; 3)
be formally evaluated according to the collective bar-
gaining agreement; and*4) "[b]ecome sensitive to the
particular needs and backgrounds of his students,
and to modify his teaching strategy when it becomes
apparent that his techniques create a climate which
impedes the students' ability to learn."111
Cohen filed suit on February 18, 1994, charging
that this order violated his free speech rights.112 On
April 14, 1995, a district court judge disagreed. 13
The court applied the standard set forth in Connick
v. Myers,1' that government agencies do not have
"wide latitude" ' to regulate employee speech that
is "on a matter of public concern." 16 Such speech
may only be regulated if balanced against "the inter-
est of the State as an employer in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performed through its
employees. ' 117 The court reasoned that, although
Cohen's discussion of pornography was "on matters
of public concern," the college's interest in educating
and in preventing the creation of a "hostile, sexually
discriminatory environment" outweighed Cohen's
First Amendment interests, as the discipline required
was "narrowly tailored" and the college's sexual
harassment policy was neither vague nor
overbroad.118
The SBVC sexual harassment policy in question
forbids "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
1407,
107
108
109
110
111
112
118
114
115
1410 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
Cannibalism is one topic that is cited in the decision. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1411.
Id.
Id. at 1407.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
883 F. Supp. at 1415 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-
50).
118 Id.
117 Id. at 1415 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
118 Id.
19961
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
sexual favors, and other verbal, written, or physical
conduct of a sexual nature" 1 9 including conduct that
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an individual's academic performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive learn-
ing environment . *.". ."I" Since this language is de-
rived from the EEOC Guidelines that have become
the standard reference for defining sexual harass-
ment, perhaps it is not surprising that the court did
not criticize this definition." 1
III. THE FIRST
IMPLICATIONS
AMENDMENT
The First Amendment implications of these cases
warrant a closer look.
The district court judge summarized his under-
standing of the issues in Robinson's complaint as fol-
lows: "Her claim centers around the presence in the
workplace of pictures of women in various stages of
undress and in sexually suggestive or submissive
poses, as well as remarks by male employees and su-
pervisors which demean women. 122
This characterization raises an important First
Amendment issue. Can workers in an "old boys" en-
vironment dislike women, look on them as sex ob-
jects, even not want to work with them? Or is the
expression of such attitudes and ideas in itself to be
considered harassing? Current First Amendment law
in other areas holds that "the First Amendment pro-
hibits regulation of racist and sexist speech on the
basis of the viewpoint expressed. '123
However, the judge's summary omits important
facts. It is not necessary to conclude that what was at
issue in Robinson was only a general atmosphere of
pictures and remarks. The district court's Findings
of Fact include a number of specific incidents that
indicate harassment targeted at her. 12 A male co-
worker handed her a "pornographic magazine. "125
Another male coworker waved around a picture of a
nude woman with long blond hair holding a whip in
"an enclosed area where Robinson and approxi-
119 Id. at 1421.
120 Id.
121 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
isa Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at.1490.
128 See Browne, supra note 2, at 482 nn.5, 6 (quoting Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th
Cir. 1985) afl'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).
'" Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1494-99.
125 Id. at 1495.
126 Id. at 1496.
1"7 Id. at 1497.
mately six men were working. Robinson testified she
felt particularly targeted by this action because she
has long blonde hair and works with a welding tool
known as a whip."11 2 6 Men left a picture of a nude
woman on the tool box where she returned her tools,
and laughed at her when she saw it and "appeared
upset.11 27 She quoted a number of sexual comments
made in her presence, many directed at her. 2 ' Sex-
ual graffiti directed at her was written on the wall in
her work area and where she hung her jacket.1 29
Another woman, Gail Banks, testified to a number
of specifically harassing incidents she had exper-
ienced, including "having a shipfitter leaderman ...
hold a chipping hammer handle, which was whittled
to resemble a penis, near her face while he told her
to open her mouth."' Banks also testified about
two occasions when she saw men posting pictures for
Robinson to encounter.' This does not exhaust the
list of incidents that indicate repeated harassment di-
rected at a specific woman, but the judge instead
chose to concentrate his decision and his remarks on
the general atmosphere at the shipyard and on testi-
mony from an expert witness as to the ways in
which stereotyping women (for example, as sex ob-
jects) discriminates against them. But reading the
factual information in the decision leaves this reader
with the conclusion that, at least after she began
complaining about the posting of sexual pictures,382
Lois Robinson was sexually harassed by her co-
workers, through remarks and graffiti aimed at her,
and being shown sexually explicit material and hav-
ing such material intentionally posted where she
could not avoid seeing it.
Also, a case might be made for the collusion of
management in some of this harassment. Manage-
ment did not just refuse to interfere with the posting
of sexual images; it sanctioned the distribution of
calendars featuring naked breasts and buttocks and
sometimes female genitalia."' These calendars "have
been delivered for years to JSI by vendors with
whom it does business. JSI officials then distribute
the advertising calendars among JSI employees with
128 "[Robinson] recalled one occasion on which a welder told
her he wished her shirt would blow over her head so he could
look." Id. at 1498.
129 Id. at 1499.
180 Id. at 1500.
181 Id. at 1501.
'3 The pictures ranged in various degrees of explicitness
from swimsuited models to depictions of group sex. Id. at 1495.
'8 See id. at 1493; see also Dennis Cauchon, Harassment,
Free Speech Collide in Florida: National and State ACLU Of-
fices Square Off, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 1991, at 9A.
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the full knowledge and approval of JSI management.
JSI employees are free to post these advertising cal-
endars in the workplace."18
The judge chose the wrong evidence on which to
base his decision, and the remedial measures that he
mandated to correct the atmosphere he deplored
were consequently impermissibly overbroad.
Much was made in the popular press of the fact
that American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") ac-
tivists in Florida and at national headquarters in
New York had some disagreements while jointly
drafting and filing an amicus brief in the Robinson
case.1 5 In a 1992 law review article, the national
president of the ACLU, Nadine Strossen, discussed
the fact that this brief did not support the entire ar-
gument of either the plaintiff or the defendant, but
found both free speech issues and equality issues
compelling. "' The Strossen article, for example,
called attention to the fact that the shipyard "has it-
self historically banned all public displays of expres-
sive activity except sexual materials," and suggested
that the court might "require the employer, if it per-
mits the posting of sexual materials, also to permit
the posting of other materials - materials critical of
such sexual expression, as well as other political, re-
ligious or social messages, which are currently
banned in the Jacksonville Shipyards workplace.'1
7
The ACLU brief argued that the alleged conduct
"consisted entirely of obnoxious and offensive speech
or other expressive activity"' 8 and that the court
erred in finding such activity to be harassing merely
because it was found to be offensive, without inquir-
ing into what comments were specifically directed at
Robinson, and "whether Robinson suffered definable
consequences that demonstrably hindered or com-
pletely prevented her from continuing to function as
an employee."' 89 The brief also pointed out that
"three of the district court's remedial orders were
184 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1493; see also Cauchon, supra
note 133.
18 Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union,
Inc., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
Ise Strossen, supra note 58, at 772 n.56.
187 Id.
188 ACLU Brief, supra note 135 at 5.
189 Strossen, supra note 58, at 772-73.
140 Id. at 773. The ACLU's brief continues:
First, the Order bans possession, reading and privately
displaying "sexually suggestive" materials. Second, it pro-
hibits jokes and other comments "in the presence" of any
employee who objects. Third, it bans the public display of
"sexually suggestive" materials without regard to whether
overbroad and therefore violative of First Amend-
ment protections. '"' 0
An issue raised in both the Johnson and Cohen
cases is the speech of public employees. The Connick
standard discussed previously was applied in both
cases. Browne raises the question of whether NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co."' has led courts erroneously to
assume that there is "a general government right to
regulate speech in the workplace."" 2 In fact, since
the First Amendment only curtails state action, the
question of the right of private employers to limit the
behavior (including expressive behavior) of employ-
ees on the job rarely comes up in the courts except
obliquely, as a duty that employers have to prevent
discrimination, including harassment.'" However,
the right of the government to limit the speech of its
own employees is circumscribed by the First Amend-
ment while that of a private employer is not. But
any speech rights claimed by government employees
must be balanced against the interest it has in per-
forming public services efficiently. As the court in
Cohen puts it, "[tlhe government as employer has far
broader powers to restrict its employees' speech than
does the government as sovereign.""'
Nevertheless, if the speech in question is "a matter
of public concern," then the government "must show
that the speech 'substantially interfered' with gov-
ernment duties," in order to prevail." 5 By this test,
Playboy magazine was held in Johnson to discuss
matters of public concern, and so was "Cohen's cur-
ricular focus on sexual topics such as pornogra-
phy."" 6 But some matters of public concern are
more equal than others. Johnson's "quiet posses-
sion" of Playboy was held to be his right, while Co-
hen's choice of topics and his "teaching style" was
held to disrupt the educational process. Based on
"testimony from the complaining student and from
other students in the class, Cohen's sexually sugges-
they are directed at any employee. These provisions
amount to a prior restraint on otherwise lawful speech,
and are unconstitutionally overbroad.
ACLU Brief, supra note 135, at 6.
141 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
14 Browne, supra note 2, at 514.
148 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053
(1984) (holding that a fast food chain could lawfully ban the
wearing of union buttons by employees who had regular contact
with the public to maintain a clean, professional image).
144 Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp.
1407, 1415 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
148 Id. at 1415 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
149-50 (1983)).
14e Id. at 1415-16.
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tive remarks, use of vulgarities and obscenities, and
the topics for discussion prevented them from
learning."147
The Cohen case raises a lot of questions, perhaps
because it was a bench trial based on a stipulated
record and written briefs. There are no examples
given in the record of the aforementioned "sexually
suggestive remarks." Furthermore, there are no de-
tails regarding the vulgarities and obscenities used in
the case. Failure to detail this information is ques-
tionable, considering the fact that the court partially
based its decision on these remarks and singled them
out as a separate category of speech not of public
concern. Did the teacher swear at his students, read
aloud literature that contained vulgar words, assign
such material? Was it germane to the subject matter
under discussion, or specifically directed at students?
And if so directed, was there an intent to harass or
discriminate?
The conclusion of the decision leans heavily on the
issue of teaching style: Cohen is to detail this style in
his syllabus and "submit to a formal evaluation of
his teaching methods," because the College "has
shown that its educational mission has been dis-
rupted for some students by Cohen's teaching
style.""' 8 Although it is not necessarily irrelevant for
a. college to wish to evaluate teaching style, surely
the time to do this is when annual evaluations of
nontenured faculty are reported; certainly evaluating
teaching style when a tenure decision is made would
be belated. But after twenty years? Why is the issue
of tenure never raised, even in an amicus brief sub-
mitted by the American Association of University
Professors? Similarly, in the court's discussion of the
"Academic Freedom Doctrine," most of the cases
cited have to do with high school teachers.' 9 An ex-
ception to this is Lovelace v. Southeastern Massa-
chusetts University.'"0 In the discussion, the court
refers twice to the fact that Lovelace was nonten-
ured, ending with the quotation, "[tjhe First Amend-
ment does not require that each nontenured profes-
sor be made a sovereign unto himself."'' Is the
word "nontenured" important here?
147 Id. at 1418.
148 Id. at 1421.
149 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
16o 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986).
1 Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1413-14 (quoting Lovelace, 793
F.2d at 424).
'6 Id. at 1410.
163 Id. at 1410 n.2.
164 Id. at 1418-19.
Why was an issue that was not raised by the stu-
dent complaining of sexual harassment not only in-
cluded in the stipulated record but featured in the
court's ruling? "Cohen discussed subjects such as...
consensual sex with children."'"" A footnote then
tells the reader that this was not discussed in English
015, the only class in which the issue of sexual har-
assment was raised. 8 But later, two written evalua-
tions by his colleagues are quoted by the court, both
of which discuss his assigning a paper on consensual
sex with children. 8'
If the issue on which Cohen was disciplined was
sexual harassment, the stipulated facts are murky.
There is one fleeting reference to a personal remark
by Cohen to his complainant: "Professor Cohen then
told her that if she met him in a bar he would help
her get a better grade.'"" That's all. Otherwise, his
choice of subject matter, which the court says is a
topic of public concern, his "vulgarities and obscen-
ities" and his "style" seem to .have led to his disci-
plining. These questions and the facts as presented
make it seem as if "sexual harassment" may have
been used as a catch-all concept to discipline an un-
usual tenured teacher whose methods are not like ev-
eryone else's.
In Bowman, due to the wording of the MCRA,
sexual harassment is no longer the issue. In her suit,
Bowman claimed intentional and reckless infliction
of emotional distress. She also made two claims
under the MCRA. 5' The trial judge ruled for Bow-
man on all counts and awarded her $35,000 in dam-
ages, an amount the trial judge said any one of the
claims deserved.'8 7 However, the MCRA states that,
in order to bring suit, interference with one of the
rights defined in the Act must be by "threat, intimi-
dation, or coercion."' 8 Since Supreme Judicial
Court Judge Abrams did not consider distribution of
two photocopies fit that definition, he, therefore, va-
cated the trial court judgment "to the extent it is
based on any violation of the MCRA."'' So Bow-
man is left with her damages, but now the damages
are only "based on the tort claim of intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress ....
166 Id. at 1410. This invitation was made after Murillo was
refused an alternate assignment. Id.
1"' The claim was that Heller had violated Bowman's right
to run for office and her right' to be free of sexual harassment.
Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1995).
167 Id. at 371-72.
16 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H (West 1995).
166 Bowman, 651 N.E.2d at 372.
160 Id.
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Bowman turns on whether the caricatures consti-
tute speech connected to an issue of public contro-
versy. That is, was the union election a public issue,
and were the caricatures meant to influence it? Bow-
man's case was based in part both on an alleged in-
tent by Heller to deprive Bowman of her right to
run for office, and a contradictory assertion that the
photocopies were not part of the election campaign
but based on personal animus. In cross-examination
her lawyer extracted from Heller the admission that,
as Judge Flannery's opinion stated, "it .was not his
intent to sway votes or to induce people not to vote
for [the plaintiff]," '161 but that he sought to make the
plaintiff "look ridiculous."16 The Appellant's Reply
Brief expands upon this quotation: "Heller ex-
plained .. .he hoped the caricatures would make
Bowman 'look [as] ridiculous' or 'absurd' as were
her campaign positions and political ideas.""'
In light of these contradictory statements, the trial
judge remarked during counsel's closing argument
that he "th[ought] [Bowman's counsel] had [Heller]
going both ways on cross." ' " Perhaps in Heller's
trial testimony he was attempting to pick his way
between contradictory charges on these points, and,
in these instances, to minimize his exposure on the
defamation charge...
The case now stands or falls on this issue of rele-
vance. Judge Nolan's dissent holds that Judge
Abrams erred in applying the Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publications, Inc.'6" three-part test for de-
termining limited purpose public figure status: First,
public controversy; 6' second, central role of the
plaintiff;167 and finally, the speech in question must
be "germane" to the controversy. 6
In all of these decisions except Johnson, conclu-
sions important to the First Amendment should have
been reached, but were not. Robinson essentially
came to the right decision by the wrong reasoning,
which led to remedial orders that, as the ACLU
pointed out, violate the First Amendment. Cohen
161 Id.
162 Id.
lea Heller Appellant's Brief, supra note 82, at 11.
16 Id. at 13 n.12.
-6- 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
166 "[An election is the absolute paradigm of a public con-
troversy ... this election would have had an effect on each of the
8700 members of Local 509." Bowman v. Heller, 651 N.E.2d
369, 377 (Mass. 1995)(Nolan, J., dissenting).
167 If a union election is a public controversy, a candidate for
president is surely central. Id.
166 Judge Abrams' opinion reasoned that "we need not de-
cide if the defendant's cartoons were germane to the plaintiff's
participation in the union election." Id. at 375. Judge Nolan dis-
raises a number of questions about the vulnerability
of professorial speech, and applies a sexual harass-
ment code to punish unspecified "suggestive re-
marks," vulgarity and obscenity, and "teaching
style." And in Bowman, the reasoning of Judge No-
lan's dissent should have been persuasive.
In these three cases, and in the sexual harassment
policy that was at issue in Johnson, we see a lack of
willingness to confront sexual harassment issues with
the viewpoint and content limitations on speech re-
strictions that are so well understood by courts rul-
ing in other policy areas.
IV. A NEW DEFINITION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
The reasoning of the judge in Robinson, of the au-
thors of the sexual harassment policy in Johnson,
and of the complainant in Cohen all have something
in common - an assumption that explicitly sexual
words and images are in themselves harassing to
women. This can be traced back to the sexual har-
assment legal definitions originating in the EEOC
1980 Guidelines.16' This wording is the model for
the MCRA chapter 151B invoked by Bowman, and
for the sexual harassment policy adopted by SBVC
that was described in Cohen. The Supreme Court
adopted the Guidelines in its Meritor decision as its
own guide, stating that they, "while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do con-
stitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."17 o
The wording of these Guidelines has been the
source of so much misunderstanding and of so many
lower court decisions that contradict the spirit of the
First Amendment that it is to be hoped that the next
Supreme Court to consider a sexual harassment case
will critically examine it and repudiate some impli-
cations- that have been attributed to it.17 1 First, the
agrees. "After reviewing the entire record ... I am compelled to
conclude that the speech in this case addressed ... the plaintiff's
candidacy for the presidency of Local 509." Id. at 378 (Nolan,
J., dissenting).
166 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
170 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42
(1976), quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
171 Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1041 (1987) with Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), afl'd, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1539 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
see also Browne, supra note 2.
19961
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
wording postulates that interfering with an individ-
ual's job performance is not a necessary factor to
sustain a charge of harassment - the word "or"
makes it an alternative to creating "an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. ' 1 7 ' A
working environment should not be defined as
harassing just because it is offensive, the law says
that to be harassing, it must be discriminatory. 178
"Verbal conduct of a sexual nature" not directed at
anyone in particular may be offensive, but it is not
necessarily harassing.
Also, the term "sexual" itself is ambiguous. Does
it refer to gender, or to explicit sexuality? In fact, it
seems to be either or both. Sexual harassment should
be understood to mean harassment because of one's
sex, not exclusively harassment by sex. As stated in
the less ambiguous first sentence of the Guidelines,
"[hjarassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
Section 703 of Title VII."'1 7 4 In deciding Vinson, the
Court drew on a line of cases forbidding harassment
based on race and religion.'17 The standards for sex-
ual harassment cases should continue to be essen-
tially similar to those for other forms of harassment.
The definition of harassment contains two crucial
elements. First, all harassment involves repeated
conduct. Second, harassing conduct always has a spe-
cific target. The 1986 edition of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary details that "harass"
is derived from a medieval French word meaning "to
set a dog on," and gives three sets of synonyms for
the word: "1. b: to worry and impede by repeated
attacks . . . 2. a: exhaust, fatigue . . . b: . . . annoy
continually or chronically.""'
Look again at FFE's suggested standard in the
light of this dictionary definition:
Title VII liability should be imposed only for a pattern or
practice of speech or conduct targeting a specific employee
or employees which a reasonable person would experience
as harassment, and which has demonstrably hindered the
employee in his or her job performance.' 7
This standard was not only submitted to the Su-
preme Court in the Harris case, but with slightly
different wording was in FFE's amicus briefs in
Johnson"'8 and Bowman19 as well. It is heartening
1' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
173 See generally id.
174 Id.
171 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
1' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1031 (3rd ed. 1986).
177 FFE Harris Brief, supra note 50, at 31.
1'7 Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Feminists for Free Expres-
that the concurring opinions in Harris both stressed
that interference with an employee's work perform-
ance is crucial in determining harassment, just as it
is in the FFE standard for liability. 80
Two other points that FFE is stressing in its
briefs are worth mentioning here. The first is that
the thicket of past labor laws intending to protect
women, known as "protective labor legislation," are
now generally understood not to have been in
women's interests. According to the FFE Johnson
brief,
[U]ntil quite recently, the law commonly provided women
workers special "protections" against exploitation, most of
which had negative effects on women's employment op-
portunities . . . .Contemporary scholars have concluded
that labor laws supposedly protecting women resulted in a
loss for women in gender-integrated jobs and probably de-
pressed wages for women even in gender-segregated jobs.
Although the protectionist premise of these measures and
the decisions upholding them is now discredited, the un-
derlying assumptions have been resurrected under a new
guise: protection from "sexual harassment." 'a
In addressing decisions that restrict expressive
rights in an "apparently growing emphasis on
cleansing the workplace of all sexual expression, ' '82
FFE indicates a second way in which current deci-
sions may be antithetical to women's interests:
Undoubtedly, this over-regulation also generates hostility
on the part of male workers who conclude that women's
entry into the workplace has occasioned this diminution of
their personal freedoms. For these reasons, the anti-sexual
assumptions increasingly embedded in hostile work envi-
ronment cases are not only offensively paternalistic but
also probably as counterproductive to the pursuit of
equality as they are destructive of free speech rights.18
This leads us to the question raised by the facts of
the Robinson case. Can we realistically expect that
women can enter non-traditional occupations with-
out ever being viewed with skepticism, or even hos-
tility? And do male workers have any right to ex-
press such negative views?
When women enter non-traditional fields in which
they are a very small minority, they are often faced
with co-workers who believe that women do not be-
long in what has been a traditionally male field.
sion at 14-15, Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F.
Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter FFE Johnson Brief].
"0 Heller Appellant's Brief, supra note 82.
180 Harris, 114 S. Ct. 371, 371 (1993)(Scalia, J.,
concurring).
'8' FFE Johnson Brief, supra at 178.
182 FFE Harris Brief, supra note 50, at 21.
I8' d.
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When male workers torment specific women in order
to drive them from the workplace, that behavior,
whether verbal or not, is prohibited. But what about
the underlying beliefs?
Browne takes the view that, even though offensive,
this expression cannot be prohibited."" The justifi-
cation for prohibiting it is counter to the spirit of the
First Amendment. That justification, often explicit,
is an assumption that if the law makes it punishable
to express a certain opinion, the people expressing it
will come to think that the opinion itself is wrong,
and they will change their minds. The experience
that dictatorships have had in trying to suppress reli-
gious and political expression indicates that this as-
sumption is not true. But the assumption is still
widely held. And it has a corollary that is, if any-
thing, even more dangerous.
It is but a small step from requiring a person to refrain
from expressing beliefs in the hope that he will cease to
hold them to requiring a person to express beliefs in the
hope that he will begin to hold them. If the state may
justify a prohibition on a person's saying "blacks are in-
ferior" by pointing to the effect of the prohibition on a
person's beliefs, the state should have equivalent power to
require that a person affirm a belief in racial equality on
the ground that repeated affirmation will cause the person
to come to believe it, and, once having come to believe it,
to conform his actions to his newly acquired beliefs. Thus,
the state could require as a condition of holding public
employment - or attending public school - that an ap-
plicant sign an "equality oath" affirming a belief in the
equality of the races and sexes.'
In fact, a school district that attempted to enforce
a milder rule was stopped by the Supreme Court
even though the country was at war at the time and
the rule only required a salute to the flag. During
World War II, the West Virginia State Board of
Education required that all school children start the
day by saluting on pain of expulsion if they stood
silent. Jehovah's Witnesses felt that such a salute vi-
olated the biblical ban on worshipping a graven im-
age and challenged the requirement in the name of
the Barnette children who had been expelled. The
Supreme Court held that this compulsory flag salute
was a violation of the First Amendment. 86 Justice
Jackson wrote in his majority opinion: "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
18 Browne, supra note 2, at 483.
16 Id. at 549-50.
188 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1942).
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." '
These words should be remembered by officials
trying to decide what opinions about women may or
may not be expressed.
V. CONCLUSION
Browne also writes,
Had courts squarely faced the first amendment issue in
hostile-environment cases, they could not have employed
the EEOC Guidelines as they did without creating a new
exception to the first amendment. The standard for hos-
tile-environment harassment cases is strongly viewpoint-
based and can be upheld only by a showing of a govern-
ment interest of the highest order. No currently recog-
nized first amendment doctrine can explain the analysis in
these cases."8
In a seemingly contrary opinion, Amy Horton
holds that "[a] decision in the Robinson appeal that
workplace expression in violation of Title VII never-
theless enjoys First Amendment protection would
have significant - and detrimental - implications
for the future of sexual harassment law, and for
women in male-dominated workplaces."' 8 9 But this
is not a complete analysis of how that case might be
decided. The problem with the Robinson decision -
apart from the fact that the imposed remedies are
overbroad - is that the judge did not separate the is-
sue of protected expression that might be offensive
from the issue of targeted harassment when he de-
cided that the totality of speech created such a
harassing atmosphere that it had no First Amend-
ment protection. He decided on the basis of that
overall workplace atmosphere, rather than by exam-
ining the specific harassing incidents.
The courts should continue to develop a new and
specific definition of sexual harassment as well as a
standard for liability that critically examines the
EEOC Guidelines with a willingness to abandon or
clarify specific wording. The FFE suggested stan-
dard, together with the Supreme Court's emphasis in
Harris on both "interference with an employee's
work performance"' 90 and the frequency and sever-
ity of discriminatory behavior, have already started
such a discussion.
The discussion must continue. The cases ex-
amined here show a willingness on the part of vari-
187 Id. at 642.
"' Browne, supra note 2, at 512-13.
189 Horton, supra note 5, at 452.
190 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 371, 371 (1993).
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ous authorities to solve potential sexual harassment
problems by "cleansing the workplace of all sexual
expression." 1 1 Private employers, university admin-
istrators, government agencies, even unions, stand to
suffer legally if they allow harassment to exist -
they have no parallel reason to be sensitive to First
Amendment rights. We must look to the courts to
balance the issues.
Unfortunately, they do not always live up to this
requirement. The task before those interested both in
191 FFE Harris Brief, supra note 50, at 21.
the advancement of women and in civil liberties is to
separate out real harassment from nontargeted ex-
pression that may be offensive to some. As FFE's
Johnson brief states, "lilt is ironic that just as
women are finally making inroads into such male-
exclusive venues as handling a skyscraper construc-
tion crane, a hostile corporate takeover attempt, and
an Air Force fighter plane, we are being told we
cannot handle dirty pictures, and certainly that we
would never enjoy them."119 2
19S FFE Johnson Brief, supra note 178, at 16.
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